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Abstract
Essays on Geography and Firm Dynamics
Marcos Ribeiro Frazao
2021
In this dissertation, I study the effects of geography on firm dynamics. I do so from
three different perspectives. The first two chapters explore how geography affects
sales of branded retail products in the United States. Chapter 1 focuses on the
spread of sales over time and space. It describes each component of sales and discusses
the potential role of word-of-mouth in the growth of brands. Chapter 2 studies the
cross-section relation of brand sales and distance. The chapter analyses how physical
trade frictions and information frictions interact and generate the observed reduction
in customer base as distance increases. Chapter 3 uses a reduced-form approach
to analyze the border-effect using Brazilian exporters’ data. I show that serving a
neighboring country increases the probability of entry, the expected growth of sales
and reduces the probability of exit.
Chapter 1 studies the spread of sales of branded products in the United States.
Distance affects the cost of moving goods and people across space. Recent evidence
suggests that geography also affects the flow of information. To investigate this
hypothesis, I study the causes of brand sales growth over time and space. I ana-
lyze data from a large set of branded retail products sold in different regions in the
United States and document a series of stylized facts about their life-cycle. I find that
brands typically sell to a small number of locations that tend to be geographically
close. Growth usually happens around previously successful markets. Furthermore,
I decompose sales into three components: customer base, prices, and quantities per
customer. Almost all of the variation in brand sales, both across locations and over
time, comes from the first term. The evidence suggests that geography plays a vital
role in customer acquisition, but not due to differences in prices. Motivated by these
findings, I propose a model in which information about brands’ existence spreads
geographically, similarly to how contagious diseases spread. Consumers aware of a
brand might ‘infect’ others with that knowledge, and the probability of contagion
depends on their location. Additionally, brands have different costs to deliver their
goods to different markets. I use the predictions for the correlation of brand sales
and customer base across regions to estimate the model using Simulated Methods of
Moments and find that information frictions are more severe between distant loca-
tions. Furthermore, eliminating the role of distance in contagion increases consumer
welfare by 32.5%. These results highlight the importance of geography for the spread
of information about brands. This relationship allows for the description of brand
dynamics across space and has significant welfare implications.
Chapter 2 studies the cross-section relations of sales and distance. How does
distance affect the sales of brands in the United States? To answer that question,
I use brand data across 44 different regions in the US. At the brand level, most of
the effect of distance on sales is associated with a reduced number of customers in
distant locations rather than sales per customer. At the aggregate level, most sales
reduction comes from having fewer brands serving other areas. To understand what
drives these patterns, I introduce a trade model between regions with shipping costs
and search frictions between brands and final consumers. The estimates suggest
that the shipping costs are a log-linear function of distance. Information frictions,
however, are lower at the origin and are not affected by distance otherwise.
Chapter 3 describes the post-entry dynamics of Brazilian exporters. This article
documents post-entry sales dynamics of Brazilian exporters and how they can depend
on the set of countries that they exported to in previous years. Controlling for
marginal costs and selection on idiosyncratic demand, the results on firm’s sales
dynamics are similar to the ones in Fitzgerald et al. (2016) for Irish firms, and are
robust to the inclusion of destination-year controls. The main contribution of this
article is to investigate how these dynamics are affected by the set of destinations
served by the firm in the previous periods. The evidence collected here suggests
that sales to destinations that are close to the ones that were previously served
by the firm tend to be higher, to grow more, and that the firm is less likely to
exit from those locations. These geographic spillovers seem to contribute to more
successful endeavors, and to be economically relevant when describing the dynamics
of exporters. Finally, the evidence suggests that these spillovers are correlated with
higher idiosyncratic demand in those destinations, but are not associated with lower
fixed and sunk costs individually faced by firms.
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Chapter 1
Brand Contagion: The Popularity of New
Products in the United States
1.1 Introduction
Spatial economics and international trade have blossomed in recent decades by ex-
ploring the economic implications of geography. Traditionally, these frameworks
consider frictions that make it costly to move goods and people. Recent evidence,
however, suggests that distance might also impact economic outcomes by making
it harder for information to flow between places. I investigate this hypothesis using
data on branded retail products sold in different regions in the United States. Brands
allow consumers to identify products that they know. Therefore, analyzing brand
data is a natural starting point to evaluate the role of information frictions between
Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts
Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.The
conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect the views
of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and
preparing the results reported herein.
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producers and final consumers, what I refer to as product awareness.
I use the Nielsen Homescan data to construct a panel of over 150,000 brands
in 44 major regions in the US over a decade. The data reveal new stylized facts
about the growth of brands in the US and the key factors behind that growth. I
show that sales are usually concentrated in a small number of locations that tend
to be geographically close. Older brands serve more markets and have higher sales,
especially in areas close to their previous top markets.
To explore what drives these patterns, I break sales down into the customer base
and sales per customer. Differences in the number of customers explain almost all of
the variation in brand sales. Sales per customer are stable for a given brand, both in
the cross-section and time-series dimension. Furthermore, I use data on bar-coded
products to break sales per customer into price levels and quantities per customer.
Neither component changes systematically over space or as the brand gets older.
These results suggest that trade costs affecting prices cannot explain the dynamics
of brand sales and customer base in the US. Hence, I take an alternative approach
and consider that the flow of information about products between different regions
is the primary driver of customer acquisition.
Information about products can be important at different stages of the consumer
decision process. The literature on product adoption often considers it to be a process
with several steps. Consumers might gather data about which products exist and
try to infer their quality and other features. However, this process invariably starts
with product awareness, i.e. knowledge about their existence. Here, as in Kalish
(1985), I reduce the adoption process to two stages: awareness and the decision to
buy the product.
I propose a parsimonious model in which the main feature is the evolution of
the number of consumers aware of each brand. The key aspect of this stochastic
2
process is contagion: consumers aware of a brand might ‘infect’ others with that
knowledge, both locally and in other regions. Some areas might be more connected
than others, which makes contagion more likely. Geography may be critical if the
distance between locations decreases the probability of contagion. The estimated
model confirms it is. With this feature the model is able to replicate the stylized
facts discussed above.
In the model, consumers’ decision to buy a product also relies on its price. They
only buy from brands they know and that have the lowest price among their cat-
egory. For this reason, the choice of the stochastic process for brand awareness is
critical. The assumptions made here allow for a simple characterization of the price
distribution. This object is necessary to compute the probability that a brand of-
fers the cheapest product within a category and that the consumer actually buys
it. Therefore, a brand’s success depends on reaching consumers and offering lower
prices than competitors.
I estimate the model for the year 2016, using a Simulated Method of moments.
The model replicates the previously mentioned stylized facts about brand dynamics.
The estimates show that distance is vital for contagion. A consumer is 50 times more
likely to spread awareness of a product to neighboring regions than to the other side
of the country. Furthermore, I use the model to conduct counterfactuals about the
welfare gains of reducing frictions. Eliminating the role of distance on contagion
increases consumers’ welfare by 32.5% in the baseline estimation. It is important
to note that this result might be sensitive to changes in key parameters, such as
the demand elasticity and the distribution of brands productivities. Nevertheless,
these results show the importance of geography for information flows. The role of
geography for contagion is essential for the description of brand dynamics, and might
have significant welfare implications.
3
Literature Review
The prominent role of informational frictions found here is in line with the recent
literature on international trade. Chaney (2014) provides a framework in which ex-
porters search for connections in other countries, and those connections subsequently
help them find others they can sell to. By considering these information frictions,
he can replicate the geographic patterns of entry by French exporters. The evidence
found here suggests that the same forces that affect trade internationally are also
present domestically.
This paper also contributes to the long literature of product and technology adop-
tion following the initial works of Rogers (1962) and Bass (1969) in which consumers’
adoption of new products rely on their interactions with other consumers, generat-
ing S-shaped adoption curves. The works that followed focused on two aspects of
product adoption: the behavioral reasons behind consumer decisions to adopt new
products and the mathematical characterization and estimation of these processes.
Recent developments in the literature also use data on the particular social network
of consumers and find evidence of the importance of their connections in the adoption
of certain products.1
These advances are important for understanding how particular businesses grow,
but there are a couple of considerations to be made when evaluating the aggregate
implications of product awareness and contagion. First, we want to consider a broad
set of products instead of focusing only on a few, since we want our results to be
representative of a large part of the economy. My data allows me to do so, as it
covers most items that final consumers buy. The other concern has to do with the
economic environment. In order to evaluate counterfactuals we need the model to
1Hauser et al. (2006) provide a literature review on product innovation and adoption in Marketing
Science, including a discussion on the current topics that are being researched in the field.
4
describe how brands compete in different locations in equilibrium. For this reason,
we develop a general equilibrium model, where many brands exist but consumers
are not aware of all of them. Brands might have different costs to serve different
locations, and for a given product the consumer will choose the least expensive one
that they are aware of.
In economics, there is a vast literature that assesses the aggregate effects of prod-
uct creation and adoption. Romer (1987) provided the initial framework that links
product creation and economic growth. Much has been done in this field and, more
recently, Perla (2019) evaluates the effects of incorporating a slow diffusion process
for new products that can explain patterns observed in the life-cycle of industries.
This paper also contributes to the long literature on the life-cycle of products.
Argente et al. (2018a) also use Nielsen data, to emphasize the short life cycle of
products. There are fundamental differences between their data approach and mine,
however. First, they use retail scanner data, while I use the Nielsen homescan panel
data. While they can compute each retailer’s overall quantity, my choice of data
allows me to construct measures of how many people consume each product. This
choice is important since the customer base is the central object of my paper. Second,
we differ in the product definition. They consider the UPC, which uniquely identifies
the bar-code of a product. In my model, information frictions affect the set of
products that consumers know. For this reason, I use the brand code constructed
by the University of Chicago Booth. Each brand consists of several UPCs that have
a similar visual identification. Argente et al. (2018a) point out that firms introduce
new UPCs to replace old ones. Therefore, I do not observe short product life cycles
as they do.
The fact that firms spend more than $200 billion annually in advertisements
5
just in the US2, suggests that reaching potential customers is very valuable. By
recognizing this, Gourio and Rudanko (2014) introduce search frictions for firms to
reach consumers, which explains long-term customer relationships and can rationalize
patterns in investment volatility by firms. In the context of International Trade
Arkolakis (2010) formulates a model in which reaching consumers is a costly activity,
allowing him to reconcile the positive correlation between firm entry and market size
and the existence of small exporters in different countries.
This paper also explores how information frictions shape the growth of brands
over time. As time passes, the brand accumulates more potential consumers because
of the continuing search and contagion. This is related to Drozd and Nosal (2012),
where firms continuously invest in increasing their customer base in different markets.
Their model generates persistent pricing-to-market and quantitatively accounts for
several puzzles in International Macroeconomics.
The stochastic structure of the model presented here draws heavily from Eaton
et al. (2019). There, random search between firms generates contacts for potential
suppliers. Distance affects search because firms are more likely to establish a rela-
tionship with the ones that are closeby. In that framework, firms buy intermediate
inputs from the lowest-cost supplier among their contacts. Here, as in Lenoir et al.
(2018) the search friction affects the relationships with final consumers. In my model,
consumers buy from the lowest cost brand among the ones they know. Furthermore,
I include the possibility of contagion among consumers. This deviation allows me to
address the stylized facts for brands in the United States.
This paper pushes the understanding of how information frictions in the form of
imperfect product awareness by final consumers can explain the dynamics of brands
and economic aggregates over a geographic space. In the next section, I describe the
2Industry figures from GroupM/Statista.
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Figure 1.1: 44 representative Scantrack® Markets.
data and proceed to introduce the model.
1.2 Data and Preliminary Evidence
In this work, I use the Nielsen Homescan panel data between 2007 and 2016. It tracks
the purchases of about 50,000 panelists per year in the US, with detailed information
about households and products. The households’ information we are interested in is
where they live, what products they buy in a given year, and how much they spend
on each product. The geographic unit that is used throughout the paper is the
Scantrack® Markets, defined by Nielsen. There are 52 of these regions that cover all
major metropolitan areas in the US. During the period evaluated, only the weights
of 44 of these regions are designed to represent the whole region’s demographics. I
restrict my attention to these locations, which account for roughly 70% of the US
population.
The Nielsen Homescan data presents two possibilities for defining a product: its
7
UPC bar code and its assigned brand code. According to the American Marketing
Association dictionary: ”A brand is a name, term, design, symbol or any other
feature that identifies one seller’s good or service as distinct from those of other
sellers.”. Since I am interested in the effects of product awareness, I naturally focus
on the brand code as the product definition, as it presents the necessary aspects for
consumers to identify and recall the product. Another reason to avoid using the
UPC for this purpose is that many similar products might have different UPCs. For
example, a 12 fl oz bottle of soda has a different UPC than the same soda in a 24 fl
oz bottle.
I define the customer base of a brand as the number of households that bought the
product at least once during a year. For each year, I compute the brands’ customer
base in each location and their total sales. The following are summary statistics for
all brands and locations in 2016.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Brands in 2016
# of Brands Avg Number of Locations Served Avg Total Sales Avg Customer Base
73,118 11.48 $ 5,372,218 331,077
We can see that most brands are present in a few locations, as the average number
of locations served is 11 out of a total of 44. It is also the case that their sales and
number of customers are fairly concentrated. To evaluate that, I first compute the
sales and number of customers in each brands’ top market. Then, I calculate their
sales and customers’ share in other locations relative to their top market. Finally,
I take the average of these measures over all brands, for their first, second, third
locations and so on. Zeros are not accounted for in this calculation. If a brand
sells to 7 locations during that year, the 0 in their 8th market is not included in the
average. Figure 1.2 displays the results.
The figures suggest that as we move away from each brand’s top markets, their
8
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Figure 1.2: Concentration of sales and customers
Note: Each dot represents the brand’s ratio of sales (customers) in their k-th market with respect to their top
market, averaged across all brands that serve at least k markets.
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number of customers and sales fall sharply and by comparable rates. The decline
is considerably more accentuated than the reduction in total sales and population
as we move away from the largest markets. One possible reason for this is that
the same product might have higher prices in different markets, which would reduce
their number of customers and possibly their sales. But there are other possible
explanations for this pattern that do not rely on differences in prices, such as the
geographic contagion mechanism presented in the model section.
To learn why brands grow, I investigate what happens to sales and customer base
as they age. I start by constructing age variables for brands. For those that entered
after 2007, I use the first year they appear in the sample to compute their age.
After that, I build an index for their sales, customer base, and sales per customer
by normalizing the variables by their initial values. Finally, I take the average over
all brands in each age group, weighted by their initial sales. This measure tells me,
for example, that brands in their second year had 2.5 times more sales than when
they entered. In the next figure, we can see that older brands sell significantly more
and to more people than they used to. However, the change in sales per customer is
more modest, with an increase of just 20% after eight years.
Although sales per customer are relatively stable, it can still be the case that
prices are decreasing. The price decline could explain the vast increase in the cus-
tomer base that we observe, as consumers would shift their consumption towards
the cheaper older brands. To investigate this hypothesis, I break sales per customer
down into two components: prices and quantities per customer.
To have a good measure of prices by brand, I construct a price index for each
brand in each location that they sell to during a particular year, as well as a nation-
wide price index for the brand. I start by constructing the average price for each UPC
by computing their sales divided by quantity in each location. After that, I divide
10














Figure 1.3: Evolution of sales
Note: Each brand’s sales, customer base, and sales per customer are normalized to 1 for their initial year. The lines
plot the weighted average of these indices for brands of different ages.
their average prices by their nation-wide average price in the first year that they
appear in the data set. The brand-level price index in a location is then constructed
by averaging all the brand’s UPC indices sold there, weighted by their particular
sales. However, some corrections need to be made, especially for the inclusion of
new UPCs in the data. If a new UPC enters the data and there were already UPCs
being sold beforehand, the new UPC’s initial index is re-scaled using the price index
for that brand in the entry period, excluding the entrant UPC. If no other UPC was
being sold at that time, the entrant UPC’s initial price index is re-scaled based on
the most recent price index of the brand.
To highlight these corrections’ importance, suppose that a brand sells a 12 oz can
of soda, and its price doubles every year. By the 3rd year, the price index for the can
would be 4. If in that year they launch a 24 oz bottle of the exact same soda with
11

















Figure 1.4: Evolution of sales per customer
Note: Each brand’s sales per customer, prices, and quantity per customer are normalized to 1 for their initial year.
The lines plot the weighted average of these indices for brands of different ages.
the same price-per-ounce as the can, the UPC price index of the bottle would be 1,
and its inclusion would bias the brand-level price-index down. The correction makes
the bottle’s initial price index to be 4 and avoids this type of bias. Unfortunately,
the correction cannot account for potential changes in the quality of new UPCs or
unit-price changes associated with different packages.
After computing prices, I construct a quantity per customer index by dividing the
brand sales by their customer base times the price index. Again, these measures are
normalized by their initial values to see how age affects them. The next figure shows
how these components affect sales per consumer. We can see that, on average, prices
do not change much as brands get older. The small movement we have observed in
sales per customer is accounted for by changes in quantities purchased. But again,
these variations are dwarfed by the magnitude of the shift in the customer base.
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Geography plays a significant role in the dynamics of brands’ sales and customers.
It is helpful to restrict our attention to a subset of the data to visualize these effects.
Ideally, one would take brands from a particular location and track their sales and
customers in different places over time. However, in our case, this is not feasible. The
UPCs that appear in the data set are re-coded versions of the products real UPCs,
so we cannot match them directly with firm data and find what their origin would
be. Even if that would be possible, the headquarters of the firm might be different
from where production happens. Also, some of these firms have several plants, so
they can engage in production in different places across the country. These features
make the definition of an origin questionable for some brands. To circumvent this
issue, I assign origin by looking at the first location that sells a product from a
particular brand. This definition is not used in the model, but by selecting brands
with a particular origin, one can observe their growth patterns on a map, which is a
good starting point.
With this in mind, I have selected the 168 brands that entered the data in 2008,
and whose first sale was in Cleveland. The reason for the location choice is that
Cleveland is relatively central, surrounded by other representative markets, and it is
not small. In the next table, we can see the decline in the number of brands that
are operating at a given year, and also that their average number of UPCs follows a
hump-shaped pattern similar to the brand sales and customers.
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 All
Number of Brands 168 100 82 70 62 59 61 53 45 168
UPCs/Brand 1.44 2.18 3.22 4.00 3.92 3.56 3.26 3.13 2.86 4.07
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for brands that entered in 2008 and only served Cleve-
land during their first year.
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Figures 1.14 to 1.21 in the Appendix show color-coded maps of the US displaying
the total sales and customer base of these selected brands in each location for their
first 4 years (2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011). There are a few things to note. First,
the patterns observed in sales are very similar to the ones observed in customers.
Sales are smaller at first and grow over time before they fall. In the beginning,
most sales happen in Cleveland and surrounding areas, as well as in the two largest
markets New York and Los Angeles. As time passes, not only do sales spread over
other regions, but it seems like areas that are close to those two large markets also
experience an unusually large increase in sales and customer acquisition.
To quantify the effects of geography in sales, I construct a measure of similarity
between brands’ sales in any two places. I start by computing the normalized sales
of a brand in each location by dividing the total amount that a brand sells there
in a given period by their average sales across all locations that they serve. This
procedure generates a vector for each brand that indicates if the amount they sell in
a location is above or below the brand’s national average, making the observations for
brands comparable. Next, I calculate the correlation between the normalized sales
of brands in those two places for each pair of locations. If this correlation is high for
pairs that are close to each other and low for pairs that are further away, it means
that places where a brand has high sales tend to be closer to other places where sales
are high, and conversely that places with low sales are also close to other low sales
places. This is precisely what we observe by plotting these pairwise correlations and
the distance between two locations, as in Figure 1.5.
I do the same procedure for all the components of brand sales that we observe:
customer base, the price index, and the remainder, representing an index for the
average quantity individual households buy in a given location. Figure 1.6 displays












Figure 1.5: Correlation of brands relative sales in two locations
Interestingly, prices and individual quantities bought do not share the same patterns.
This suggests that the geographic pattern that we observe for sales must be explained
by something that affects customer acquisition in places that are close to each other,
while not being explained by differences in prices.
After observing the geographic concentration of sales and customer base, I can
compute similar correlations between pairs of locations in different periods. The
lagged correlations measure the similarity of the variables in one region today and
another tomorrow. The figure suggests that sales and customer base also display
geographic persistence, in the sense that a higher level of sales in one location today
is associated with higher sales in nearby areas tomorrow.
One potential explanation for that is what I call contagion, in which consumers
that are aware of a brand can inform unaware consumers that are nearby. This
mechanism is similar to the one which Chaney (2014) uses to model French exporter’s
































Figure 1.7: Correlation of brands relative sales one period ahead
very simplistic, in the sense that if a consumer is aware of a good they demand one
unit of it. Here, I provide a framework in the spirit of Eaton et al. (2019), in which
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information frictions prevent buyers from having access to all sellers, and they choose
to purchase the least expensive variety that they are aware of. The model generates
predictions about the distribution of brands’ customers in different locations that
can be brought to the data, and there is effective competition in the sense that not
only must a brand be known, but it must also be cheaper than its competitors so
that it makes a sale. This competitive setting might, therefore, be more suited for
counterfactuals and welfare analysis.
1.3 Model
The model describes an economy that is composed of a discrete number of locations
populated by consumers. They buy different varieties of products, and many brands
can produce each variety. The key feature of the model is the description of a brand’s
customer base dynamics. Consumers buy a product if they are aware of the brand
and if it is the cheapest among the known brands for that variety.
The evolution of the number of consumers aware of a brand - the potential cus-
tomer base - is governed by a stochastic process. This process describes the brand
actively searching for consumers in each region and the possibility of consumers
spreading this information to others. If this contagion is more likely among con-
sumers close to each other, the model predicts the patterns of geographic concentra-
tion and persistence observed in Figures 1.6 and 1.7.
The nature of the stochastic process comes from the literature in epidemiology.
The particular modeling choices made here generate a closed-form solution for the
distribution of brands’ potential customers. This way, it is easy to compute the
probability that the product is the cheapest one found by the consumer. I start by
describing the evolution of the potential customer base. Then, I move to production
17
technology, consumers’ preferences, and equilibrium outcomes.

















Figure 1.8: Timing of the model.
When a brand is created, it searches directly for consumers in all markets. The
number of consumers it reaches this way in location l follows a Poisson distribution,
ND0,l ∼ Poisson(λl), independent across all regions.
After that, the consumers who have been contacted can inform others who were
previously unaware and spread the information about the brand’s existence, which
is akin to how contagious diseases spread. Let N0,l denote the number of consumers
that the brand has matched in its first period in location l. This random variable is









The n(i) random variables denote the number of potential consumers that each aware
consumer can “infect” locally and in other regions. A high draw for ND0,m also impacts
the expected number of consumers in market l due to contagion. Note that N0,l is
a compound random variable since the number of elements in the summations is
random.
My goal is to have a simple characterization for the potential customer base of
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brands with different ages, and dealing with compound random variables can be chal-
lenging. For this reason, I use the Generalized Poisson distribution, henceforth GP,
which has properties that make the compounding due to contagion straightforward.
This distribution was introduced by Consul and Jain (1973) as an extension of the
Poisson distribution. It includes an extra parameter that allows for the variance to
exceed the mean. If X ∼ GP (λ, φ), then E(X) = λ1−φ and V(X) = λ(1−φ)3 . The
Poisson distribution is the special case in which φ = 0. Notice that increasing φ
above 0 increases the mean, but increases the variance by even more. Shoukri and
Consul (1987) describe the use of the Generalized Poisson to characterize the total
number of people infected by a contagious disease in a setting that is reasonably
similar to our framework here. The properties that simplify the characterization of
the potential number of buyers are the following3:
If X ∼ GP (λX , φ), Y ∼ GP (λY , φ) are independent, then X + Y = Z ∼ GP (λX +
λY , φ).
If X ∼ GP (λX , φX) and {Yi} ∼ GP (φY , φY ) is a sequence of iid random variables
that are also independent from X, then X + ∑Xi=1 Yi ∼ GP (λX , φX + φY ).
Property 1 is similar to the convolution property of the Poisson distribution, and
it allows to add up independent draws of GP. Property 2 allows for compounding,
and it is extremely helpful in the context of contagion. Notice that the number of Yi
random variables in the summation is X, which is a random variable itself.
I assume that the number of consumers that each aware consumer is able to
reach in their own location is n0,l(i) ∼ GP (φ, φ), with φ ∈ [0, 1). Recall that ND0,l is
simply Poisson distributed, which means that ND0,l ∼ GP (λl, 0). The second property
implies that ND0,l+
∑ND0,l
i=1 n0,l(i) ∼ GP (λl, φ). Consumers also contribute to the spread
3The first property is derived in Consul (1989). The proof of the second property consists of an
induction argument on the p.m.f of the resulting distribution to show that it is equal to the p.m.f.
of GP (λX , φX + φY ).
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of awareness to other locations. I assume that the total number of consumers that
each aware consumer in m finds in location l, is ∑ND0,mi=1 n0,ml(i) ∼ GP (λmλml, φ).
Noting that the total number of consumers that became aware with information
coming from different locations is independent, we can use the first property of the








After contagion happens, the brand sells its product to consumers. The average





1 − φ .
We can see the influence of the other locations in the expansion of the customers
in l, through the contagion parameters λml. This is also evident when we compute
the covariance of the number of aware consumers in two locations Cov(N0,l, N0,m) =
[λlλlm+λmλml](1−φ)−2. The higher λml and λlm the higher the correlation between
location l, m.
As we have seen in the data, the correlation between customers in close regions is
higher. This suggests that λlm is higher if locations l and m are geographically close.
Since I want to study the effects of distance on the information frictions, I model
the contagion parameters as a function of distance: λlm = C0 exp(−C1distancel,m).
This choice allows having a simple description of how geography affects the contagion
friction and greatly reduces the number of contagion parameters to be estimated.
Before the next period, some of the consumers aware of the product forget about
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its existence. I consider a survival process similar to a binomial survival process for
a random variable with a Poisson distribution. Say that R ∼ Poisson(λ) describes
the number of people that know about a brand. If each of these individuals is inde-
pendent and equally likely to forget about the brand existence, and the probability
of it happening at the individual level is δb, then the distribution of the individuals
that remember the brand conditional on X is R|X ∼ Bin(X; (1 − δb)). The un-
conditional distribution of the consumers that remember is R ∼ Poisson((1 − δb)λ).
Unfortunately, this survival process does not preserve the form of General Poisson
distribution. However, the Quasi-Binomial distribution of type-II introduced by Con-
sul and Mittal (1975) does. If X ∼ GP (λ, φ) and R|X ∼ QBDII(X; (1 − δb), φ/λ),
then R ∼ GP ((1 − δb)λ, φ). Since I use this operation quite frequently, I define the
following operator
If X ∼ GP (λ, φ), then χ(X)|X := QBDII(X; (1 − δb), φ/λ).
Evaluating χ(X) before knowing the value of X implies that χ(X) ∼ GP ((1−δb)λ, φ).













After that, the brand directly searches for consumers as before. The number
of consumers that they find is independently distributed ND1,l ∼ Poisson(λl), and
contagion happens as in the previous period. Since the number of newly found
potential consumers is independent from the ones that remember the brand, we can
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write
















































. Given the properties of the GP,
the mean and variance of the potential customer base is
E(Nla) =
Λla
1 − φ, V(Nla) =
Λla
(1 − φ)3 .
The average number of potential customers grows with age, and so does the variance.
The assumption that there is a positive probability that consumers forget about the
brand guarantees that the process is stationary.
This process is related to epidemiologic metapopulation models4. There, infected
people in one location might spread the disease to others in different places. The
main difference here is that consumers are only contagious when the brand directly
found them. This assumption limits the intertemporal effects that contagion might
have on the evolution of the customer base. However, it allows for a closed-form
4See Sattenspiel (2009) for examples.
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characterization of the distribution of all brands’ potential customer base given their
age. This helps keep track of how many brands each consumer is aware of, which is
a key market condition that governs the probability that a brand actually sells its
product.
To evaluate the effective number of customers for each brand, we move to the de-
scription of the costs that the brand faces and how consumers choose which products
they buy.
Technology
The data doesn’t assign an origin to a brand. Consequently, it is harder to consider
the effects of geography on the costs of delivering goods to different locations, as it is
not possible to model the production cost plus the shipping costs explicitly. However,
the model circumvents this problem by considering that brands are assigned a vector
of productivities to deliver their good in different locations. This setting allows for
the interpretation that regions with low costs are close to the production site, and
the ones with high costs are hard for the brand to reach. This interpretation is also
consistent with several plants producing a single brand’s goods, which is the case
for many well established retail products. The data also suggests that differences in
brand prices across regions are not essential to describing the geographic patterns of
their sales. Therefore, I choose to simplify the cost structure of brands and allow for
a richer characterization of awareness evolution.
A brand can deliver the good that they produce in every location l = 1, . . . , L,
but at different costs. Each brand has a linear productivity in each location zl. The
measure of brands of all ages that have their productivity vector greater or equal to
z, element by element, is5











This implies that for zl > 0, the measure of brands of all cohorts that have
productivity higher than zl is Ml(zl) = Tlz−θl , and the correlation between the pro-
ductivities of a brand in any two locations is 1/θ. The measure of brands that have
delivery cost below c is then μl(c) = Tlcθ. After every period a fraction of δe of
brands of all ages cease to exist and are replaced by entrant brands. This implies
that the measure of brands of age a that have unit costs below c in location l is
μal (c) = δe(1 − δe)aμl(c) = δe(1 − δe)aTlcθ.
The parameters Tl govern how costly it is, on average, to deliver a good to a
particular location. In the data, regions might have different price distributions for
various reasons, such as rents or distance from where production happens. In the
model, Tl can capture these cost differences. In equilibrium, however, the price index
of a location also depends on how well information about brands circulates.
Consumers
All consumers have the same utility function. They value consumption in a single














ε−1 of brands draw z from a multivariate Pareto distribution as in Mardia (1962) with CDF 1 −(∑L
l=1
zl
(εTl)1/θ − L + 1
)−θ
, and to take the limiting case as ε → 0.
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There is perfect substitution within a given variety j. Consumers in l are endowed
with X̄l/Ll units of cash every period. Their budget constraint is
∫ 1
0 pt(j)qt(j)dj =
X̄l/Ll, where j indexes the varieties. They are aware of many brands that produce
each variety. They are also indifferent about which brand produces the good. There-
fore, their decision process consists of looking at all the costs from brands they know
as quotes and buying from the cheapest one. Now, I describe the distribution of the
number of brands consumers know.
Consumers are equally likely to be hit by any type of shock that either makes
them aware or unaware of a brand. Therefore, the intensity that consumers in l
are matched with a brand with age a is simply the average number of consumers
reached by brands of that cohort, divided by the local population: Λl,a
Ll(1−φ) . Hence,
the distribution of the number of quotes that consumers have with cost below c is



















This implies that the probability that a buyer encounters no quotes below c for a
given variety is exp(−ρl(c)). The effective price paid by the consumer is the lowest
quote they can find. The price distribution in l is given by integrating over all
varieties in the unit interval [0,1]:






This is the distribution of quotes from brands of all ages. To study brand sales
evolution, I derive the quote distribution of brands with a particular age from eval-
uating the probability that a consumer buys from a brand from that cohort. The
distribution of quotes that a buyer in l receives from brands with age a also follows














Hence, the distribution of the lowest quotes coming from brands with age a in
location l is





The probability that a variety is bought from a brand with age a can be found by
solving the following integral πla =
∫ ∞








This equation shows two forces at play that affect the probability that consumers
buy from a given cohort. On the one hand, as brands get older, they become more
well-known, as shown by the Λla term that increases with age. However, as time
passes, a brand is also more likely to exit, as we can see on the (1− δe)a term. Those
two forces generate a hump-shaped curve for the total customer base and sales of
particular cohorts, similar to what we observe in the data.
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Price Index and equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium, I start by constructing the price index, which im-
poses a necessary parameter restriction for its existence. Second, I describe each
brand’s effective customer base, which is needed to compute its sales, and discuss
the market clearing conditions in detail.





1−σ , where p
is the effective price paid by consumers. As mentioned above, the price paid is the
lowest quote that consumers can find, which implies that Gl(p) = 1 − exp(−νlpθ).












This equation implies that we need to impose the parameter restriction that
θ > σ − 1, for the equilibrium to be well-defined.
The CES preferences imply that a consumer spends c1−σl P σ−1l X̄lLl in a variety with
cost cl. To find the total sales of a particular brand, we need to characterize the
total number of consumers that effectively buy their product. Let Bla(cl) denote the
random variable that describes the customer base of a brand with age a and that has
cost cl. As previously discussed, age matters for the distribution of their potential
customer base Nla, but each potential consumer has a probability exp(−νlcθl ) of
actually buying the product. This implies that, given a realization of Nla, the number
of buyers follows a binomial distribution with parameters Nla and exp(−νlcθl ). We
can use the total law of expectations to show that
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E[Bla(cl)] = E[E[Bla(cl)|Nla]] = E[exp(−νlcθ)Nla] = exp(−νlc
θ
l )Λla
1 − φ .
We can see that on average older and efficient brands have more customers.
However, randomness still plays an essential role in the outcomes of specific brands.
First, even a brand with high productivity might be unlucky to match consumers
who have found cheaper alternatives. As time passes, this effect is mitigated by the
expected increase in their potential customer base. But the trajectory of consumers
who are aware of the brand is also random, and some brands will be more successful in
finding consumers. In particular, if a brand directly finds consumers in one location,
they might ‘infect’ others randomly. If the contagion parameters are larger for close
regions, this luck can also spread to neighboring places. This process generates the
pattern we observe in the data: the customer base of a brand is geographically
concentrated and persistent.
In the data, we observe the same geographic pattern for sales. We can see this
in the model by writing the brand sales as xla(cl) = c1−σl P σ−1l X̄lLl Bla(cl). Therefore,
the expected sales of a brand is




1 − Φla .









The model generates other predictions that can be brought to the data. Going back
to the definition of the effective customer base of a brand Bla(c), we know that
Bla(c)|Nla ∼ Bin(Nla, exp(−νlcθ)). This implies that a brand that has Nla potential
customers has a probability (1 − exp(−νlcθ))Nla of not selling to any of them. Since
Nla ∼ GP (Λla,Φa), we can use the p.m.f. of the Generalized Poisson distribution to
numerically compute the probability that a brand of age a and cost c finds at least
one customer in l as








We can then integrate over all brands costs to find the mass of brands that operate





Furthermore, we can add these cohorts to find the total number of brands that serve
each location as Fl =
∑
a Fla.
One way to compute the average number of buyers among brands that operate
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in a market is to add up all the customers that brands find in a given location and
























These moments are targeted in the estimation algorithm and are helpful to iden-
tify the probability that a consumer forgets about the brand δb.
Furthermore, there are closed-form solutions for the variance of customer base,
but the solution for the covariances is quite involved. These moments are crucial
for the identification of the contagion parameters. To proceed with the estimation,
I rely on the Simulated Method of Moments. For thousands of brands, I simulate
draws for productivities, the evolution of the potential customer base, and whether
consumers effectively buy the brands’ products. I then use the model-generated data
to compute the correlation between the customer base and brands’ sales in different
locations. I describe the algorithm in more detail in the next section.
1.4 Estimation
In this section I describe the algorithm to estimate the model. The first thing to
notice is that the parameter β does not affect the equilibrium allocations, and in our
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context is only relevant for welfare calculations. When performing those exercises
we choose a range for β that is compatible with the literature on intertemporal
discounting.
I start by recovering an estimate for the elasticity of substitution, σ. If I want to
identify the true elasticity of demand, I should control for supply-side endogeneity
of prices. However, the model has the strong assumption that sales happen at cost,
so under the model assumptions this is not an issue. Therefore, even if the estimate
for the demand elasticity might not be generalized to other contexts, it allows the
model to generate predictions about quantities sold that are aligned with the data.
Under the model assumptions, if a consumer buys a good with price p, the quan-
tity that they acquire is:




The equation states that the quantity demanded depends on a location-specific
factor, including the local price index, individual spending, and the price. Since the
measures that I have for prices and quantities are indices computed for each brand, I
regress the quantities sold by a brand in a location on the price paid there, including
location and brand fixed effects.
ln(ql(ω)) = −σ̂ ln(pl(ω)) + Il + Iω + εω,l,
where ω denotes an individual brand, ql(ω), their quantity index and pl(ω) their price
index. So σ̂ is the estimate for the elasticity of substitution that is consistent with
the patterns of local demand observed in the data.
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The estimate found here is σ̂ = 0.1257, which is a low number in comparison to
the literature. There are a few reasons why this might be the case. One of them is
relying on variation for a brand’s quantities per customer in different locations. As
shown before, this variable does not change much. Therefore, this could be capturing
the inelastic demand for quantities for a particular good once the consumer decides
to buy it. For example, one might still buy a single bag of chips for lunch, even
when there are significant discounts. This might be problematic when computing
the welfare measures, as this parameter also governs the elasticity across different
varieties. For this reason, it is important to consider alternative values for σ when
conducting these analyses.
After that, I estimate the remaining parameters of the model, using a Simulated
Method of moments. Let Θ = (θ, δe, δb, λ, φ). For every Θ I pick a vector of Tl that











where ν̄l := νl/Tl and P̄l is the average of the normalized prices of brands in location
l. The parameter Tl defines the average draw of costs in each location and directly
affects the price level in a region. A higher Tl increases the brand probability of
having low costs in that location ex-ante. But it also influences the competition
landscape since it affects the distribution of costs and the probability that the brand
effectively sells its product to a potential consumer.
I separate the moments that are targeted by the algorithm into two groups: m1(Θ)
and m2(Θ). The first group represents moments that do not require simulation and
can be computed directly. They are the number of brands that sell in each location,
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their average customer base, and average sales Fl, b̄l, x̄l. For the year of 2016, I
can assign age for brands with a = 0, . . . , 8, so I also target the number of brands,
average customer base and average sales by cohort (Fla, b̄la, x̄la)8a=0. The evolution of
the number of brands is important to identify the parameter δe, which determines
the exogenous exit rate of brands. The evolution of the average customer base and
sales provide information about the depreciation of customer base δb.
The second set of parameters requires simulation. I choose a large number of






− L + 1
)−θ
. This distribution is convenient as it has
closed-form solutions for the marginal distributions F (zl), and the conditional distri-
butions Fl(zl|(z̄)), where z̄ is any subset of z. This allows me to draw z sequentially:
z̄1 ∼ F1(z1), z̄2 ∼ F2(z2|z̄1), . . . , z̄L ∼ FL(zL|z̄1, . . . , z̄L−1). After that, I simulate the
evolution of brand awareness by sequentially following the steps of customer acqui-
sition described in the model: direct search, contagion based on the previous draws
and then the number of the customers that forget. I divide the K̄ number of brands
in cohorts with size proportional to the model implications for brand survival, that
is 1− δe to the power of the cohort, and compute their trajectories until the current
year. This way, the distribution of brands age is similar to the model predictions.
With the values of productivities and potential customer base in hand, I compute
the probability that a consumer buys a product from each brand as exp(−νlcθl ). I use
the brand-location specific probability of actually selling the good and the number of
potential customers to draw the number of actual customers. After that, I compute






. This way, I can compute the same normalized correlations of brand
sales and brand customer base as shown in Figure 1.6. I also compute age-specific
correlations both in the model and in their data. Those moments are the key elements
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that guide the choice of the contagion parameters, since the greater the contagion
parameters between two regions, the larger their current correlation of sales and
customers.
Finally, the algorithm searches for the set Θ̂ that solves the following problem
Θ̂ = argminΘ||m(Θ) − m̄||, s.t. Θ > 0, φ < 1, θ > σ̂ − 1,
where the model implied moments are m(Θ) = [m1(Θ), m2(Θ)], and m̄ are their
data counterparts.
I have intentionally not included the lagged correlations of Figure 1.7 as a moment
to be targeted. This way, I can evaluate how well the model performs in describing
the dynamics of the geographic spread of brands by contrasting the predictions of
the estimated model with these moments.
Now I discuss the results of the estimation and the counterfactuals.
1.5 Results and Counterfactuals
The following summarizes the estimated parameters, and the moments that are as-
sociated with their identification.
Figure 1.9 plots the values of the estimated λ̂l against the total sales for all brands
in each market l in the year of 2016.
The estimated model predicts a crucial role for distance in the strength of con-
tagion. To see that, compare the two closest regions, D.C. and Baltimore, with the
ones that are furthest away, Seattle and Miami. For the cities on the opposite side
of the country, contagion is very unlikely. The contagion parameter between them is
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Table 1.3: Estimated parameters and associated moments
Parameter Value Target
σ 0.1257 regression




C0 0.5316 corr(bla, bma)
C1 0.0015 corr(bla, bma)
λl See Figure 1.9 E(bl0)
5 10 15 20 25 30
X
l








Figure 1.9: Estimated values of λl and total sales in location l
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C0 ∗ exp(−C12730) = 0.0089. The contagion parameter between the two cities in the
middle of the east coast, on the other hand, is quite large C0 ∗ exp(−C135) = 0.5044.
On average, an informed consumer in D.C. spreads information to more than 0.5 con-
sumers in Baltimore. This is more than 50 times the contagion probability between
the two distant regions.
To further investigate how geography affects the outcome of brands in the model,
I return to Figures 1.5 and 1.6. They describe how close regions tend to be more
similar concerning sales and number of customers. I use the model simulated data to













Figure 1.10: Correlation of brands relative customer base: data x model
We can see that the model performs quantitatively well in replicating the ge-
ographic concentration patterns observed in the data for sales and customer base.
Furthermore, the model predictions for prices and individual quantities are not geo-













Figure 1.11: Correlation of brands relative sales: data x model
sales and customer base, although with higher levels.
I also evaluate the model predictions with respect to the geographic persistence,
by computing the model-predicted correlations for sales and customer base as in
Figure 1.7.
We can see that the model generates geographic persistence, but to a lesser degree
than observed in the data. One reason behind that is the strong assumption imposed
on the contagion process that only newly found potential customers might spread the
information to others. As discussed before, this assumption reduces the influence that
the current customer base has in acquiring customers in the future. Since contagion
is more likely to happen in closer regions, this assumption reduces the degree of
geographic persistence. Now, I discuss the counterfactuals, using the estimated model
as the benchmark.
First, I evaluate the implications of reducing information frictions. I use the


























Figure 1.13: Correlation of brands relative sales one period ahead: data x model
In the benchmark, contagion parameters are defined as λlm = C0exp(C1distancel,m).
I assume that in the counterfactual economy, distance does not matter. There,
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the contagion parameter between any two locations is λ̃lm = C0 = 0.5316. Notice
that I compare two stationary economies, meaning that the counterfactual economy
always had λ̃lm governing the evolution of brand awareness. The computation of new
outcomes is straightforward since all equations derived before still hold for the new
economy.
The welfare for consumers with CES utility function can expressed by their real
income, which is Wl = X̄l/PlLl. Since the income and populations remain the same,
our measure of welfare gain is ΔW̃l = W̃l/Wl − 1 = Pl/P̃l − 1. The price level in the






















−1. The average welfare
gains across all 44 locations is 32.5%, which is a large number and very likely to be
dependent on the value of particular parameters. Moreover, some places are more
affected by this change than others. While New York has the smallest increase in
welfare, 18%, Portland’s gains are the highest: 40%. In the counterfactual economy,
information about the existence of brands circulates more. Therefore, consumers are
more likely to find brands with lower prices, and consequentially increase consump-
tion. Next, I evaluate the welfare gains of eliminating the effects of geography on
costs.
In models where shipping costs among locations are explicit, this exercise can be
conducted by reducing them to zero. Consider the case of a firm that has a cost c
to produce and sell their good locally but face an iceberg cost of τ to deliver it to
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another location. In this case, the effect of geography is eliminated by setting τ = 1.
This makes selling to other sites as expensive as selling domestically. The same logic
is applied in this exercise.
The productivity vector z accounts for differences in the cost of selling to different
locations. We can consider the situation where all brands have their costs reduced to
their lowest z−1l in all areas. This way, each brand might sell its good to all locations
at its lowest cost, similar to what eliminating shipping costs would do.
Again, I consider that the counterfactual economy is stationary, meaning that all
brands faced the alternative distribution of costs since their beginning. As in the
previous exercise, to calculate the welfare, I need to compute the new price indices P ′l .
However, this is not straightforward anymore. Consider the productivity vector of a
brand z = (z1, . . . , zL). In the counterfactual economy, its productivity vector would
be z′ = (z, . . . , z), where z = max(z1, . . . , zL). The distribution of the maximum
entry of the productivity vector does not have the same properties of the original
marginal distribution. I briefly describe how I compute the new price distribution
numerically.
First, I follow the same steps as the estimation procedure to draw the productivity
vector for millions of brands. After that, I find the highest productivity entry for
each brand. I assign a brand’s cost in every location as the inverse of its highest value
zl. Then, I estimate the density of the new cost distribution using a standard kernel
function. After that, I multiply the estimated density function by the measure of
brands simulated K̄. The result is dμ′(c) analogous to dμl(c) in the original model.
Here, μ′(c) is the measure of brands with the lowest cost below c. Notice that the
brand’s cost now does not depend on the location they sell to, but their ability to
reach customers is still location-specific.
To compute the price distribution, I calculate the intensity that consumers in l
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The new price distribution is G′l(c) = 1 − exp(−ρ′l(c)), and I can compute the








Now, I can compute the welfare gains in each location ΔW ′l . The average of the
welfare gains across all locations is 57%. This is also a considerable improvement in
consumption associated with reducing the costs of brands that consumers are already
aware of. However, these estimates are potentially sensitive to the estimation of the
demand elasticity and other parameters of the model.
The interpretation of the last counterfactual as the reduction of shipping costs
requires another important caveat. Suppose that the model had a considerably
larger number of locations, i.e. take L to be 1000. When the largest productivity is
selected, the odds that any brand achieves a high number is substantial. Therefore,
the cost reduction associated with geography is also conflated with increased expected
productivity associated with more draws.
Nevertheless, the counterfactuals show that significant welfare gains are associ-
ated with reducing the impacts geography has on contagion and reducing the costs
of brands that consumers already know.
41
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies how brand sales evolve over time and space in the United States.
I show evidence of a significant role for geography in the growth of brands. Unlike
traditional spatial economics and trade models, these differences are not associated
with changes in costs and prices.
To reconcile the data with economic modeling, I posit that geography can affect a
brand’s customer base through informational frictions that are not directly associated
with changes in prices. I provide a parsimonious model of the geographic spread of
brand awareness that relies on contagion: customers aware of a brand might infect
unaware consumers with their knowledge. The model can replicate the stylized facts
about how brand sales and customer base evolve. Furthermore, the estimates show
that the proposed information frictions are more severe between distant locations.
The model can also contrast the welfare costs associated with reducing the role of
geography in prices and the flow of information. Finally, it can also evaluate how
much expected revenue a single aware customer generates by considering the spread
of this knowledge and the probability that consumers reached will effectively buy the
product.
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1.7 Appendix - Tables and Figures
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Locations in 2016
Location # of Brands Sales ($MM) Location # of Brands Sales ($MM)
New York 28,771 33,967 Portland 17,664 7,161
Los Angeles 25,569 25,574 Orlando 17,952 7,024
Philadelphia 24,922 15,605 Richmond 17,879 7,009
Boston 22,731 14,328 Salt Lake City 16,317 6,528
Chicago 25,238 14,212 Sacramento 19,482 6,521
Washington, D.C. 23,094 13,158 Hartford 16,195 5,889
Dallas 22,151 12,890 Birmingham 16,317 5,886
San Francisco 20,017 12,406 Cincinnati 17,613 5,857
Miami 20,279 11,534 Indianapolis 16,398 5,630
Houston 21,592 11,207 Oklahoma City 15,025 5,421
Tampa 21,541 11,134 Nashville 15,933 5,336
Phoenix 21,615 10,933 Baltimore 16,893 5,230
Atlanta 21,050 10,862 St. Louis 17,696 5,217
Detroit 21,687 10,480 San Diego 15,591 5,054
Seattle 20,254 8,935 Grand Rapids 16,043 4,901
Denver 19,429 8,557 Columbus 17,492 4,827
Cleveland 20,047 8,502 Charlotte 17,453 4,793
Raleigh 18,840 8,290 Kansas City 16,236 4,707
San Antonio 18,908 7,884 Louisville 16,303 4,637
Pittsburgh 17,976 7,380 Buffalo 17,407 4,611
Minneapolis 19,695 7,247 Milwaukee 15,535 4,246
New Orleans 16,928 7,198 Memphis 13,514 4,014
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Figure 1.14: Sales of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2008
Figure 1.15: Sales of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2009
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Figure 1.16: Sales of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2010
Figure 1.17: Sales of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2011
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Figure 1.18: Customers of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2008
Figure 1.19: Customers of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2009
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Figure 1.20: Customers of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2010
Figure 1.21: Customers of Brands that started in Cleveland - 2011
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Chapter 2
Internal Gravity and Customer Base
2.1 Introduction
The gravity relation introduced by Tinbergen (1963) states that the bilateral trade
flows between two countries are directly proportional to their size and inversely
proportional to their distance. This empirical regularity was found extensively in
International Trade data and became an important tool to understand how distance
affects the flow of goods between different locations. In recent works, such as Allen
and Arkolakis (2014) and Caliendo et al. (2019), this relation is also successful in
describing the domestic trade and migration patterns within a country.
Traditionally, spatial economic models that produce this relation rely on the as-
sumption that trade costs increase with distance (Anderson, 1979). As two locations
are further away, it is more costly to ship goods between them. Consequently, it is
Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts
Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.The
conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect the views
of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and
preparing the results reported herein.
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less expensive to buy a particular good close to where it is produced than in dis-
tant locations, which generates an incentive for people in one place to consume more
goods from nearby regions.
Recent evidence, however, points toward another way in which distance reduces
trade. Eaton et al. (2019) and Chaney (2014) assume that information frictions
make it harder for sellers to reach consumers in distant locations. This setting al-
lows the authors to reproduce empirical regularities found on French exporters’ data.
The information frictions differ from physical trade costs since they generate other
predictions for prices and entry. Therefore, measuring how much of the effect of dis-
tance on the gravity relation comes from physical trade costs instead of information
frictions is significant for quantitative models of trade.
In this paper, I use brand-level data in different regions in the United States to
separate the effects of both types of frictions. Using brand-level data is appropriate
for studying information frictions between final consumers and firms because brands
summarize information about products that allows consumers to identify them1.
Moreover, studying the market for coffee, Draganska and Klapper (2011) shows that
brand awareness varies across consumers and directly affects the probability that
they buy particular products.
In this chapter, the relevant measure of distance is between the brand origin and
their potential customers. This definition allows us to compare the effects of differ-
ent types of costs that brands face to reach their consumers directly. It is important
to highlight that this approach is fundamentally different from the previous chap-
ter. The main element of the previous analysis was the possibility that contagion
happened among consumers. Therefore, the relevant measures of distance there are
1According to the American Marketing Association dictionary ”A brand is a name, term, design,
symbol or any other feature that identifies one seller’s good or service as distinct from those of other
sellers.”
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among potential consumers in different regions.
I use the Nielsen Homescan panel data to construct a data set of more than
150,000 unique brands, their sales, and customer base in 44 different regions in the
United States. The data provides novel insights into the effects of distance on sales
of retail products. At the brand level, distance greatly affects brands’ customer base,
but it doesn’t reduce individual sales by the same amount.
Furthermore, I also investigate the aggregate sales of all brands from a particular
region. I can decompose the effect of distance on aggregate sales into the number
of brands, average customer base, and average individual sales. For the aggregate
bilateral sales, the number of brands that enter each market is the most important
component that explains the decline in sales as distance increases. Furthermore,
due to selection, the average customer base of brands that sell to distant locations
is actually higher than the average brand that sells locally. Finally, these effects
are more drastic when distances are small, which contrasts with the original gravity
relation.
To separate the effects of distance due to physical trade costs and information
frictions, I use a spatial model of trade between regions. Brands face shipping costs
to deliver their goods to other areas and are also subject to information frictions. I
assume that final consumers only buy products from brands that they know. Con-
sumers and brands are matched using a standard matching function, where the
intensity of these matches depends on the brand’s and the consumer’s location.
I calibrate the model to match the data for the year of 2016. The results show
that the physical trade costs are increasing with distance and the information friction
parameters are lower at the origin, but are otherwise not affected by distance.
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2.2 Empirical Evidence
The Nielsen Homescan panel data surveys around 50,000 households every year and
contains detailed information about the retail products they buy. The survey also
assigns weights to households based on their demographics to make the sample rep-
resentative. Between the years 2007-2016, there are 44 regions in the USA with a
representative sample. I measure a brand’s total sales in each of these markets by
computing the weighted sum of the total value of products from that brand sold to
households in that location. Furthermore, I also construct a measure of customer
base by counting the number of households that bought products from each brand,
again using the weights provided by Nielsen.
There are 150,206 different brands in the data. However, they do not have an
origin assigned. To circumvent this issue, I look at all the brands that I observe their
entry period, which could be anytime between 2008-2016, and assign their location
as the first market that they serve. This assumption is in line with most spatial
economic models that predict that firms start selling locally before reaching out to
other regions.
Out of all the brands in the sample, I can assign an origin to 43% of them. How-
ever, due to the selection of younger and potentially smaller brands, they correspond
to only 4% of the total sales in all years. On average, brands with origin assigned
serve 7.38 markets, as opposed to 11.24 in the full sample.
The inclusion of new cohorts mitigates this problem. For 2016, I observe brands
with ages ranging from 0 to 7 years. In this year, the brands with origin account for
7% of total sales. For this reason, I choose to calibrate the model targeting the data
moments of this year. But before that, I present some regressions that describe the
effects of distance on brand-level sales and aggregate flows considering all the years
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in the sample.
Let xij(ω) denote the total sales of brand ω, with origin i in market j in a given
year. I compute the total bilateral sales between i and j in that year (Xij), by adding







Sales of Brand ω
.
The first assessment evaluates how distance affects the aggregate bilateral flows.
To do so, I regress the log of the bilateral flows on the log of distance and dummies
that cover each combination of origin and destination in different periods. This is
the same setting as the traditional gravity relation, and if the magnitudes are similar
the coefficient β̂ should be equal to −1.
Table 2.1: Gravity relation







Adjusted R2 0.935 0.795
Residual Std. Error 0.314 (df = 16640) 0.548 (df = 1848)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
We can see that distance is negatively associated with the bilateral flows between
two locations. However, the coefficients’ magnitude is lower than the traditional
gravity relation, which would be -1. This could be because the sample selects mostly
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young and small brands. To mitigate this, I also run the same regression considering
only the year 2016. The point estimate goes from −0.196 to −0.315, which is still
lower than the evidence from the international trade literature.
For the next analyses, I consider a set of equally spaced dummies between lo-
cations instead of the log of distance as an explanatory variable. In this setting, I
use the local sales as reference, where distance would be zero otherwise. The reason
for this choice is to consider the possibility that the effect of distance on the flow of
retail goods varies. For example, it can be the case that it doesn’t matter whether
two locations are 1500 or 2000 miles apart, but it could still make a difference if they
are separated by 15 or 20 miles.
I also use the measure of each brand’s customer base to decompose their sales in
a given location by the number of customers and the individual sales. The sales of
brand ω from j in market i can be decomposed as





I regress the brand-level sales and their components on the set of distance dum-
mies, brand-specific dummies and destination specific dummies. The next table sum-
marizes the result, and the next figure plots the coefficients for sales and customer
base for each distance bin.
There are two critical takeaways from this evaluation. First, the drop between
selling locally and at other locations is quite sharp, and the effects of distance further
fade away as it increases. Second, the decomposition shows that 80%of the effect
of distance on sales is due to the brand having a smaller customer base in distant
locations, not by reducing individual sales.
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Table 2.2: Effect of distance on brand-level variables
log(xijt(ω)) = α +
∑10
k=1 βkDk(distij) + γt(ω) + δjt + εijt(ω)
log(sales) log(indiv sales) log(customers)
distance bin 1 −0.297∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
distance bin 2 −0.367∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
distance bin 3 −0.409∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
distance bin 4 −0.443∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
distance bin 5 −0.479∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
distance bin 6 −0.493∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
distance bin 7 −0.510∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
distance bin 8 −0.540∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
distance bin 9 −0.523∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
distance bin 10 −0.543∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.004) (0.008)
Observations 1,389,225 1,389,225 1,389,225
R2 0.567 0.724 0.533
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.697 0.488
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Figure 2.1: Effect of distance on brand-level variables
















Notice that now there are three elements in the decomposition: the number of
brands, their average customer base, and average individual sales. I regress all those
variables in a set of dummies for distance and destination and origin fixed effects.
The next table summarizes the results.
As expected there is not much action in the individual sales. It is interesting
though, that now the effect comes from the number of brands that serve each market.
Curiously, the average number of customers is larger for destinations that are not the
origin. The reason for this is because brands that only sell locally tend to be quite
smaller than the ones that reach to other regions. Since the aggregate regressions
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Table 2.3: Effect of distance on aggregate variables
log(Xijt) = α +
∑8
k=1 βkDk(distij) + γit + δjt + εijt
log(total sales) log(numb brands) log(avg customers) log(avg indiv value)
distance bin 1 −0.984∗∗∗ −1.226∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
distance bin 2 −1.132∗∗∗ −1.399∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
distance bin 3 −1.241∗∗∗ −1.475∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
distance bin 4 −1.311∗∗∗ −1.534∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
distance bin 5 −1.408∗∗∗ −1.593∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
distance bin 6 −1.468∗∗∗ −1.647∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
distance bin 7 −1.515∗∗∗ −1.676∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
distance bin 8 −1.561∗∗∗ −1.665∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 17,423 17,423 17,423 17,423
R2 0.938 0.972 0.842 0.540
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.971 0.835 0.518
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Figure 2.2: Effect of distance on aggregate variables
lump all those brands together by the distance of the market that they serve, we
find that, on average, the customer base of brands increase as we consider distant
locations.
These findings point towards the customer base of brands as the main driver
of their sales in different locations, and decision to enter in different markets. In
the next section, I propose a model that rationalize these findings, and is able to
separate between the physical trade frictions that affect the cost of delivering goods
and information frictions that might affect how many people actually know the brand
in different locations.
2.3 Model and Results
Consider an economy with i = 1, 2, . . . , N locations. There is a continuum of varieties
j ∈ [0, 1] of final goods. Those goods are produced using only labor as a production
factor, and each location i is endowed with Li workers that supply one unit of labor
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inelastically at the equilibrium wage wi.
Technology
For a given variety j, location i is able to produce it using the linear production
function q = zi(j)li. The measure of potential producers from i that have efficiency
zi(j) ≥ z is μZi (z) = Tiz−θ. There is an iceberg cost τni ≥ 1 of delivering one unit of
a good from i to n. For a given productivity level zi(j), the unit cost of delivering a
good to destination n is wiτni
zi(j) . Therefore, the measure of firms in i that are able to
deliver a good to n at a unit cost below c is μni(c) = Ti(wiτni)−θcθ.
Consumers








There is perfect substitution within a given variety j, which implies that the
consumer will choose the supplier that offers him the lowest price. However, the
consumer is not aware of all the suppliers of a particular variety. The knowledge
about the suppliers is subject to a matching friction between firms and consumers.
Matching
The number of matches that happen between consumers from n and firms from i




1 − γ L
1−ϕ
n Sn(c)−γ, ϕ, γ ≥ 0,
where Sn(c) =
∑
i λniμni(c) are all the potential sellers. Summing across all






1 − γ L
1−ϕ
n Sn(c)1−γ.
Consistent with this matching function, we have that the intensity with which a
buyer in location n encounters a seller from i with unit cost equal to c is
λni(c) = λniL−ϕn Sn(c)−γ
Aggregating over all potential suppliers from each source and cost below c implies



















1 − γ .



































Therefore, the probability that a buyer encounters no quotes below c is given by
exp(−ρn(c)) = exp(−νncθ(1−γ)). Therefore, the distribution of the lowest costs in
location n has the following C.D.F.





which is the the equilibrium distribution of prices in location n.
Bilateral Trade Shares and Price distributions
The distribution of quotes below c that a buyer in location n receives from a particular







1 − γ = νnic
θ(1−γ).
Hence, the best distribution of the lowest quotes that location i offers to n is
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where νni = λniTi(wiτni)−θ L
−ϕ
n Υ−γn
1−γ . The probability that a supplier in n comes













Moreover, the distribution of prices in n coming from i of goods that are actually
bought there is the same as the price distribution in that location, since we can show




s =i[1 − Gns(q)]dGni(q). This imply that the bilateral trade
share is also given by Xni
Xn
= πni.

























Here, we see that in order to have a well defined price index we need to impose
the parameter restriction that θ(1 − γ) > σ − 1.
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This imply that the equilibrium wages and bilateral flows are only functions of
the trade frictions τni, λni, population Li, Technology Ti and shape parameter θ.
Other important equilibrium objects (such as the Price Indices) that are important
for welfare analysis will depend on σ, γ, ϕ]
Implications for Individual Producers
A firm operates as long as it has at least one buyer. The number of buyers that
firms have do not depend only on their productivity, but also on their luck in finding
consumers. For a firm in i that has cost c of delivering to n, the number of encounters
it has with consumers from that location is Poisson distributed, with parameter
eni(c) = Lnλni(c), λni(c) = λniL−ϕn Sn(c)−γ.
Having met a buyer, they make a sale with probability exp(−νncθ(1−γ)). Com-
bining the two results, the number of customers in n buying a variety from supplier
in i with unit cost of delivering to n equal to c is distributed following a Poisson
distribution with parameter ηni(c) given by
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ηni(c) = λniL1−ϕn [Sn(c)]−γ exp(−νncθ(1−γ)).
this is also the expected number of buyers on that location.
Now consider a firm from i that can produce a good and deliver it domestically
at cost c. Their cost of delivering the good to location n is cτni and consequentially





Therefore, the probability that a potential producer from with domestic unit cost
c has at least 1 buyer anywhere is 1 − exp(−ηWi (c)). Furthermore, the measure of















[1 − exp (−ηni(cτni))] dμii(c).






















Consider a firm from i that has a cost of delivering domestically equal to c. If they
are matched with a consumer in n that buys their product, the expected value of
their sales is going to be
xni(c) = XnP σ−1n pni(c)1−σ = XnP σ−1n (cτni)1−σ




In order to recover the parameters of the model, I use only the data from 2016, since
the selection problems are less severe for the last year in the sample.
I directly observe the population of each location, and take the shape parameter
of the productivity distribution to be θ = 4.87. This is the same value for the shape
parameter in Eaton et al. (2011), for the distribution of productivities in the French
manufacturing sector.
With that in mind, the set of parameters we need to calibrate are (σ, γ, ϕ, τ , λ, T ).
The algorithm that identifies each parameter is divided in three parts. The first part
pins down (ϕ, γ, λ), using data on average customers from each pair of origin and
destination. We find λ̃ni := λniL
(1−ϕ)
(1−γ)
n that is able to precisely match the model’s
prediction for the average number of buyers that brands from i have in destination
n, jointly with γ that matches the variance of the number of buyers. After that, if we
assume that the population size is orthogonal to the bilateral informatoin frictions
λni, we can regress log(λ̃ni) on log(Ln), so that the regression coefficient is an estimate
of 1−ϕ1−γ , and the error is an estimate of λni.
The second part of the calibration exploits the data on the aggregate bilateral
flows and expenditure Xn. We normalize τii = 1 for every location, and using the
system of equations that pins-down the bilateral flows and equilibrium wages I can
find the τni and Ti that match the bilateral flows and the total expenditure.
The parameter σ is the one that remains to be estimated. I use the sales per









τ 1−σni , I regress log(xni(c)/xii(c)) on log(τni), including origin and




Let λ̃ni := λniL
1− (ϕ)(1−γ)
n . Our first goal is to write the average number of buyers from
a brand that is from i and n as a function of γ, λ̃ni and observables. The average
number of buyers inn of brands in i is b̄ni = RniNni , where we know that Rni = πniLn
and Nni =
∫ ∞
0 [1 − exp(−ηni(cτni))] dμii(c). We can define y = Tiw−θi cθ and change
the variables of integration, so we get that
















0 [1 − exp(−η̃ni(y))] dy
.
Given γ, I can find the matrix of λ̃ni that match what we observe in the data for
bni, πni and Ln.
After that, I compute the variance of bni. I choose the set {γ, λ̃(γ)} that makes
the model generated variance of bni for all pairs of locations equal to their data
counterparts.
In order to recover ϕ, I make an identification assumption that λni is orthogonal
to Ln. I regress lnλni on a full set of origin and destination fixed effects. Then
I regress the destination effects on lnLn to recover β̂ = 1 − ϕ/(1 − γ). Hence,







I assume that τii = 1 for all locations. This implies that there are no shipping
costs associated with selling locally. I then choose the remaining iceberg costs and











The last step is to recover the parameter σ. To do so, I use the model predic-
tions for the individual sales of the same brand in different destinations. I regress
ln(vni(ω)/vii(ω)) on a set of origin and destination factors, and the estimated ln τni.
The OLS coefficients represent an estimate for σ − 1.
Results
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients.
The congestion parameters found in the estimation suggest that congestion on
the side of the seller is not very important, but it is significant on the buyers side. In
the model, this means that the number of matches that a brand finds in a location
is almost independent of that location population. However, competition matters
a lot. The more sellers available in a location, the harder it is for a brand to be
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Table 2.4: Estimated coefficients
Description Parameter Value
Efficiency Het. θ 4.87
Congestion Seller γ 0.0119745
Congestion Buyer ϕ 1
Matching Friction λni Various
Iceberg Costs τni Various
Technology Shifter Tn Various
Elast. Subst. σ 1.165
Figure 2.3: Physical frictions by distance
matched there. This is an interesting result and, since the parameters are close to
their boundaries, they indicate that another matching function might have a better
fit.
Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution is also quite low. This is expected,
because these parameters are estimated using regressions on the individual values
for the same brands in different locations. As we have seen in the empirical analysis
that these quantities do not change much for different locations.
In the next figures I plot the estimated physical and information frictions between
all two pairs of locations, by the distance between them.
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Figure 2.4: Information frictions by distance
Both plots show that there is a lot of variation with respect to those estimates,
and distance cannot fully predict the iceberg costs and information frictions. Never-
theless, the results for the iceberg costs are expected: two locations that are further
away tend to have higher transportation costs.
The result for the information frictions, on the other hand, are quite puzzling.
They suggest that, on average, brands find it easier to connect with consumers in
locations that are different than their origin.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper introduces new findings concerning the role of distance for brand sales
in the United States. Here, I show that the reduction in brand sales associated with
increasing distances is primarily due to the decrease in their number of customers at
the brand-level. At the aggregate level, however, this reduction comes from entry:
there are fewer brands that serve distant locations.
To understand what drives these patterns, I propose a model of trade among dif-
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ferent locations that includes two types of frictions. The first one is the traditional
iceberg cost. If a brand is selling to an area that differs from the origin, they incur
a physical cost. The second friction is informational. Buyers are not aware of all
the brands, and they only buy from the ones they know. The set of brands that a
consumer is aware of is determined by random matching with brands from all loca-
tions. Furthermore, the intensity in which buyers and brands are matched depends
on their location.
The estimation shows that, as expected, iceberg costs are increasing with distance.
However, no clear relationship between distance and the intensity of the information
frictions is found. This might suggest that the direct flow of information between




Geographic Spillovers and Exporter’s
Growth
3.1 Introduction
There is a vast literature documenting the dynamic of firms in the context of both
closed and open economies. The subject is relevant since many decisions that ulti-
mately shape aggregate economic variables are taken inside the firm, such as buying
inputs, hiring, and investing in capital, innovation, and marketing.
In particular, firms that are part of a global economy choose which foreign coun-
tries that they serve, and their pricing and quantity strategy for their products in
each destination. These decisions are not trivial since different countries are subject
to different juridic systems, use their own currencies, have potential language barri-
ers, and trade costs associated with distances that often surpass the ones of selling
domestically.
Since the previously described features of selling to a particular foreign market
should be reasonably similar across all the firms from the domestic country, most
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of the research on firm dynamics in open economies focuses on the evolution of
the productivity of firms as being the only driving force at the firm level1. This is
a natural approach, but it misses a few empirical regularities, that could only be
captured by assuming other types of heterogeneity across firms.
The fact that firms can have different paths in terms of the countries that they
serve has been addressed by a few recent papers. In Morales et al. (2019), the
authors use Chilean customs data and observe a path dependency in the countries
that a firm serves: they are more likely to enter markets that are similar to the ones
that they are already serving. In that context, similar means that they share common
characteristics, such as official language, per-capita GDP, border, or lay in the same
continent. They estimate a structural model that attributes these differences to lower
sunk costs in entering destinations that are similar to the ones that a firm already
supplies to.
The role of distance in establishing particular paths for firms’ destinations has
also been scrutinized by Chaney (2014). In that paper, he proposes a network model
in which firms search for costumers in locations that are distributed in a geographical
space. Firms are then more likely to find customers that are located close to the ones
that they already sell to. Using French firm-level data, the model is simulated and it
can rationalize several features of the distribution of the distance of exports across
French firms that are hard to fit under more standard assumptions.
Both papers are focused on this type of proximity effect on the extensive mar-
gins of exporting. To the best of my knowledge, there is no work available on the
consequences of these forces on the intensive margins, and the dynamic of sales in a
broader sense. Hence, this paper tries to document and quantify these effects using
1Examples that are a part of this literature include Arkolakis (2016) and Costantini and Melitz
(2007).
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Brazilian customs firm-level data.
Besides the novelty in documenting these features, the quantification exercise is
important for a few of reasons. If those quantities are considered to be large, by
incorporating these effects in their analysis economists will be able to have better
predictions on the dynamics of exporters. This collaborates to more precise estimates
of relevant economic variables, such as short-run and long-run trade elasticities, and
international trade effects on TFP.
Also, the empirical exercises presented here for post-entry dynamics can shed light
on what are the potential mechanisms driving the aforementioned proximity effects
on entry. For example, we document that proximity between the set of previous
destinations served by a firm and a new destination leads to higher sales in the
first period there. This suggests that it is not likely that entry was facilitated due
to smaller fixed or sunk costs, but that the higher profitability came from larger
demand faced by the firm in that location.
This article is directly related to the empirical literature of post-entry export
sales dynamics, such as Eslava et al. (2015), and Ruhl and Willis (2016). These
papers use transaction- and plant-level data on Colombian firms, and describe the
growth path of exporters, specially in their early years. The closest article from this
literature is Fitzgerald et al. (2016), since the methodology here draws heavily from
their work. The reason for that choice is twofold. First, we want to be sure to control
for year-specific shocks at the firm level. The reason for that is to avoid documenting
sales dynamics that arrive due to shocks that affect the firm as a whole, such as the
evolution of the firm’s productivity. The second reason is that we want to check how
the results depend on controlling for selection. As we will see, since these proximity
effects reduce the probability of exit at any given time, controlling for selection using
ex-post spell length will have major implications for the estimates of their effect on
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sales.
Since we only observe the value of sales, we are silent with respect to disentan-
gling price and quantity dynamics as in Fitzgerald et al. (2016) themselves, Vicard
et al. (2016), Piveteau (2015), and Timoshenko et al. (2016). This is unfortunate,
because separating the two gives important information about the underlying driving
mechanisms for the sales dynamics, as it is done in Foster et al. (2016), for example.
Ultimately, the objective of this research project is to fully describe the mechanisms
behind these geographical effects on exporter dynamics. Hence, the characterization
of quantity and price dynamics, coupled with a model that can rationalize them, are
the natural follow up steps of this project.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: section II describes
the Brazilian customs data, section III discuss the empirical methods and results,
and section IV concludes. Supporting material can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Data
We use yearly data from the universe of customs declarations for merchandise exports
from Brazil. The data is collected by SECEX, a government office which is a part
of the MDIC (Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services). The data includes
all declared exports, by firms and individuals, covering the years of 1990-2001. In
order to make the variables comparable, we convert each transaction to 1992 dollars.
Finally, we compute the yearly sales for each firm to each country we aggregate all
their exports in each year.
The bilateral data on geography comes from CEPII GeoDist database. Here we
focus on the border effects, so we only use the data on which country shares borders
with another.
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Finally, it is worth detailing how the variables tenure and spell are constructed.
The tenure variable keeps track of the amount of years a firm has continuously served
a particular destination, at the current period. In order to assign a value to it, we
need to observe their first year serving that market. For example, if we observe that
a firm only exported to France in the years 1991, 1992 and 1993, the value assigned
to the tenure variable would be 1 in 1991, 2 in 1992 and 3 in 1993. Notice that if
we observe that this firm was also selling to France in 1990 we would not be able to
pin-down the value for the tenure variable, because our data set starts in 1990 so we
do not observe the year in which the firm entered in that destination.
The spell variable assigns the ex-post number of years that the firm has continu-
ously spent in a particular destination. In our previous example of a firm that served
France only for the years of 1991, 1992, and 1993, the value of the spell variable
would be 3 in 1991, 3 in 1992, and 3 in 1993. It is important to notice that even
tough this variable is the same for a continuous exporting experience, a firm can
have more than one continuous experience in a given destination if they exit and
enter there again. In this case, the firm would potentially have two different values
for their spell in the destination, depending on the year of the observation, which is
why we also need to index this variable by date.
Furthermore, notice that we do not treat for churning in any way, meaning that
whenever a firm goes from not selling to selling to a country it counts as an entry,
regardless of their previous experiences, and the same goes for exiting, so that we do
not distinguish between temporary and permanent exits.
Since many successful experiences are going to have missing values if we consider
the precise spell length we top-code them at 6 years, which is half the length of the
our data span. By doing so, some values for ex-post spell that were unknown but
are definitely larger than 6 years are assigned the value of 6, the maximum level of
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the top-coded spell. We later denote these group as 6+, to remind the reader that
it encompasses all spells greater or equal than 6 years.
For our estimations we will not consider the sales of firms that have censured
tenure, and censured spell below the top-code of 6 years. However, we still use these
dropped observations to compute the border variables that are going to be used
as regressors later on because these variables describe the firm’s export activities
in other countries and potentially other years, so we want to be sure that all the
information is being considered. The construction of these variables is going to be
explained in the next section, when they are introduced.
3.3 Empirical Approach
3.3.1 Sales
Table 3.1 in the appendix presents the results of all the exercises performed in this
section for sales, that are controlling for the spell length.
The first empirical exercise we do is to replicate the specification in Fitzgerald
et al. (2016), for the dynamics of sales. Using Irish customs data, they want to
observe how sales change due to how long the firm has been selling in a given country.
In order to control for aspects that can affect the firm as a whole, such as changes
in their idiosyncratic productivity, they include firm-year fixed effects. Notice that
these coefficients are properly identified, since the same firm can sell to multiple
destinations and the coefficient is common across destinations in a given period. Also,
in order to control for selection within the firm-year on unobserved heterogeneity in
idiosyncratic demand, they separate the exporting experiences of firms according to
their ex-post duration. Hence, we run the following specification
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+ εikt . (3.1)
The variable xikt is the log of sales of firm i in country k, f it is the firm-year fixed
effect, aikt is a vector of indicator variables for the tenure (“age”) of firm i in market
k, in the same way sikt is a vector of indicator variables for the ex-post spell length of
firm i in country k at time t. The Kronecker product between the tenure and spell
dummy variables (aikt ⊗ sikt ) generates a set of dummy variables for the tenure-spell
pair. Since we choose the single-period spells to be our reference, each element of β
represents difference between the sales of given pair of tenure-spell with respect to
the reference group, all else equal.
The sole difference between this specification and the one that they use in their
paper is the that they use destination controls that are constant over time (δk),
where we allow these controls to change over time (δkt ). We believe this to be more
adequate, since there could be changes in the aggregate demand from country k
due to macroeconomic fluctuations, and to changes in bilateral trade costs. This
inclusion is potentially relevant, since the time frame covered by our data includes
major changes in trade costs, such as the creation of the Mercosur. As we can see
in Table 3.1 in the appendix, the estimates barely change regardless of the choice,
which serve as a robustness check of this specification. All the figures that we display
in the body of the text include destination-year controls. The results and figures for
the specifications with the destination controls restricted to be constant over time
are reported in the appendix.
In order to compare the predicted ratios of export sales for different tenures we
can use the properly exponentiated estimates of β. We report the values of the ratio
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of predicted sales, for every pair of tenure-spell, with respect to predicted sales of a
single year spell. The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval for those
values. The results are similar to the ones in Fitzgerald et al. (2016): longer spells
are associated with a larger initial size and faster growth, and the initial and final
sales are similar for the same spell.






































Figure 3.1: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (1)
Moving forward, we want to observe if selling to neighboring countries affect the
sales dynamics of firms. The first step is to construct a measure for that, so we define
the dummy variable bikt . This variable takes the value of 1 if the firm was active in a
country that shares a border with country k during period t. Next, we include those
variables in the previous specification by separating the tenure-spell cases, between
the ones in which the firm exported to a bordering country in the previous periods
and the ones it did not. The regression is:
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xikt = δkt + f it + β′
(
aikt ⊗ sikt ⊗ bikt−1
)
+ εikt . (3.2)




























1 year spell, border=0
2 years spell, border=0
3 years spell, border=0
4 years spell, border=0
5 years spell, border=0
6+ years spell, border=0
1 year spell, border=1
2 years spell, border=1
3 years spell, border=1
4 years spell, border=1
5 years spell, border=1
6+ years spell, border=1
Figure 3.2: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (2)
In Figure 3.2, again by exponentiating the estimates on β, we can compare the
sales predictions among different tenure-spell-border tuples. There, the reference
level is sales for one period spells for countries in which the border variable is zero.
We can see that for a given tenure-spell pair it does not seem to make big difference
in the estimates if the firm was serving a neighboring country in the previous period
or not. The notable exception happens when the spell group is the one of 6 or more
years. As we are going to see more clearly in the regressions on probability of exit,
this seems to happen because the border effects, which we will denote by geographic
spillovers, seem to positively affect the length of spells. However, by fully controlling
for ex-post spell length, there is no difference in the dynamics. In the case of 6+ year
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spells, we have top-coded it so spell lengths more years also fall into this category.
Hence, within this group, we see that the geographic spillovers are indeed quite large.
For example, in their fourth year of tenure of the 6+ spell group the predicted sales
if bikt−1 = 1 are about 37.5% larger in the same tenure-spell for a firm that does not
served any neighboring market in the previous period.
One problem with this approach is that our analysis might be polluted from
firms that are switching between 0 and 1 for the border variable. This wouldn’t be a
problem if we were regressing it on a relative variable, such as the growth rate from
one period to the other, but since xikt is measured in levels, the interpretation of the
β coefficients is not clear. Trying to mitigate this inconvenience, we define b̃ikt as a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm i operates in a country that
shares a border with k throughout the whole spell, and is 0 if the firm does not sell
to any bordering country throughout the whole spell. Hence, many observations such
that these variables changed will have a missing value to that variable. They will
not help to estimate the β, but we include them in the regressions to have better
estimates of the firm and destination effects. We regress
xikt = δkt + f it + β′
(
aikt ⊗ sikt ⊗ b̃ikt
)
+ εikt . (3.3)
The qualitative results seem to be unchanged from the previous specifications.
The predicted sales for when b̃ikt = 1 are still quite similar to the ones when b̃kt , with
the exception of the 6+ spell group, which seems to have an even larger gap now.
Now, we focus on the effects of the geographic spillovers unconditioned to the
ex-post spell length. We regress the following specification
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1 year spell, all-border=0
2 years spell, all-border=0
3 years spell, all-border=0
4 years spell, all-border=0
5 years spell, all-border=0
6+ years spell, all-border=0
1 year spell, all-border=1
2 years spell, all-border=1
3 years spell, all-border=1
4 years spell, all-border=1
5 years spell, all-border=1
6+ years spell, all-border=1
Figure 3.3: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (3)




+ εikt . (3.4)
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 3.2 in the appendix. The
reference group is now the entrants (1 year tenure) with the border variable b̃ikt = 0.
The effects of the geographic spillovers is indeed much larger in this context, and
it increases with tenure. At one year of tenure, the predicted sales for the firm with
b̃ikt = 1 is about 22% larger than the firm with b̃ikt = 1 = 0. This gap increases to
about 87% in their eighth year of tenure, which suggests that these effects are indeed
large.
The effects are larger here for a few reasons. First of all, we are going to see in
the next section that the border variable is associated with a lower probability of
exit at any tenure level. As we have seen in the previous results, the longer spells are
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border=0 throughout the whole spell length
border=1 throughout the whole spell length
Figure 3.4: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (4)
associated with higher growth. Those two features of the data explains why when
we stop controlling for spell we see that the group of observations with b̃ikt = 1,
which has a longer expected spell-length, has a higher expected growth. Another
possible explanation for these figures arrives if the fact that the firm was selling to
a neighboring country in the previous year has a positive effect on growth. In that
case, the two groups that we are comparing here are the extreme ones in the sense
that one of them was not exposed to this effect in any period, and the other was
exposed in every period. Hence, these positive effects on growth would accumulate
over time for the latter, which would increase the difference between the level of sales
of these two groups over time.
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3.3.2 Probability of Exit
Now, we focus on the Probability of a firm exiting a market, given their tenure.
Again, we control for firm-year fixed effects, and destination fixed effects, as in
Fitzgerald et al. (2016), and destination-year controls, in order to check for the
robustness of the results. All the regression results from this section can be found




X ikt+1 = 1|X ikt = 0
]
= δkt + f it + β′aikt + εikt . (3.5)
The variable X ikt is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i sells
to destination k during the year t. Again, aikt is a set of dummies that represent the
year of tenure, with the reference level being the first year of tenure.
Figure 3.5 displays the results, which are similar to the ones in Fitzgerald et al.
(2016). As we can see, the probability of exit decreases with tenure, and the fall is
sharper in the initial years.
Now, we want to check if selling to a neighboring country has any effect on the
probability of firms exiting a given market. We run the following regression:
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Figure 3.5: Exit Probability and Market Tenure - specification (5)
Pr
[
X ikt+1 = 1|X ikt = 0
]




+ εikt . (3.6)
Figure 3.6 displays the results and it is clear that the geographic spillovers have a
large negative impact on the probability of a firm exiting a market. The probability
of a firm exiting a market right after its first year of tenure is about 9pp lower if the
firm was selling to a neighbor of that country during that year. This gap is slowly
reduced over tenured years, but even in the 6th year of tenure it is about 3pp.
This result could just be driven by the observations with bikt = 1 having larger
sales than their peers with the same tenure. In order to check this conjecture, we
include the log of the current sales (wikt ) on the probability of exit regressions. Hence,
we run:
84


































Figure 3.6: Exit Probability and Market Tenure - specification (6)
Pr
[
X ikt+1 = 1|X ikt = 0
]




+ wikt + εikt . (3.7)
Figure 3.7 displays the results of regression (7). We can see that including the
log of sales affects our estimates. It reduces the difference for the probability of exit
in the first year of tenure to about 7pp, and around the 5th year of tenure the gap
seem closed. Hence, part of the negative effect of the geographic spillovers on the
probability of exit seems to be explained by a positive correlation between selling to
a neighboring country and the size of the sales. But even controlling for that we find
that the geographic spillovers have a large effect in reducing the probability of exit,
specially in the first years.
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Figure 3.7: Exit Probability and Market Tenure - specification (14)
3.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature of ex-post exporter dynamics. We start by
replicating the results on sales dynamics, and probability of exit in found in Fitzgerald
et al. (2016) for Irish data in our Brazilian customs data. As in that paper we find
that, controlling for destination and firm-year fixed effects, longer spell-lengths are
associated with a larger initial sales levels and higher initial growth. Also, for a given
spell-length, the predicted level of sales in the entry period is similar to the one of the
period that the firm exits a market. Furthermore, we also find that the probability
of exit is decreasing with tenure. These results are robust to the inclusion of time
varying destination controls, which endorses their findings.
After that, we introduce variables that can describe the effect of geographic
spillovers in our estimations. We understand geographic spillovers as being the pos-
sibility that previous years activity in neighboring countries have positive effects in
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a given location.
We conclude that controlling for tenure, firm-year and destination-year fixed ef-
fects, the geographic spillovers are associated with larger revenues, lower probabilities
of exit, which contribute to longer spells, and higher growth. Also, since the effect
on lower probabilities of exit persists after controlling for the level of sales, it seems
that the positive effects of geographic spillovers do not only rely on having larger
levels of sales in a given period.
Furthermore, when we use controls for the selection on idiosyncratic demand
faced by the firm, by including ex-post spell length, the effects of the geographic
spillovers vanish. This is not surprising, since we are effectively controlling for how
successful a particular endeavor of a firm has been. This is also a good check that
these controls are effective in characterizing selection on idiosyncratic demand, and
that they are good “sufficient statistics” on the dynamic of firms.
These results generate some interesting insights. Morales et al. (2019) and Chaney
(2014) provide two different stories that could explain why firms are more likely to
enter in destinations close to the ones that they are already selling to. In the first
paper, the idea that fixed and sunk costs would be lower is the driving mechanism
for their observed increase in the entry probability, whereas in the second paper this
happens because there is a higher probability of finding new customers close to your
current ones. The findings here that the initial sales are higher due to the border
effect endorses the second explanation, since we would expect that the initial sales
would be lower otherwise.
Furthermore, we have also observed that these geographical effects are not only
related to entry, but that they are relevant during the whole exporting period, and
they are associated with lower probabilities of exit. Those patterns are helpful in











































Figure 3.8: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (1 rest)


































1 year spell, border=0
2 years spell, border=0
3 years spell, border=0
4 years spell, border=0
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6+ years spell, border=1
Figure 3.9: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (2 rest)
xikt = δk + f it + β′
(
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Figure 3.10: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (3 rest)
xikt = δk + f it + β′
(


































border=0 throughout the whole spell length
border=1 throughout the whole spell length
Figure 3.11: Ratio of predicted sales - specification (4 rest)





































Figure 3.12: Difference in Exit Probability - specification (5 rest)
Pr
[
X ikt+1 = 1|X ikt = 0
]
= δk + f it + β′aikt + εikt
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Figure 3.13: Difference in Exit Probability - specification (6 rest)
Pr
[
X ikt+1 = 1|X ikt = 0
]






































Figure 3.14: Difference in Exit Probability - specification (7 rest)
Pr
[
X ikt+1 = 1|X ikt = 0
]




+ wikt + εikt
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Table 3.1: Regressions on sales controlling for selection
Spec. (1 rest) (1) (2 rest) (2) (3 rest) (3)
Border NA NA 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Ten.Spell
1.1 NA NA NA 0.16*** NA 0.16*** NA 0.13*** NA 0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1.2 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.57*** 0.42*** 0.58***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2.2 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.42*** 0.57*** 0.42*** 0.58***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1.3 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.73*** 0.65*** 0.73*** 0.62*** 0.74*** 0.63*** .75***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
2.3 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.00*** 1.11*** 1.00*** 1.11 0.96*** 1.13*** 0.97*** 1.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
3.3 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.73*** 0.61*** 0.74*** 0.58*** 0.74*** 0.59*** 0.73
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
1.4 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.88*** 0.78*** 0.89*** 0.72*** 0.91*** 0.74*** 0.93***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
2.4 1.26*** 1.26*** 1.29*** 1.37*** 1.30*** 1.38*** 1.27*** 1.40*** 1.28*** 1.40***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3.4 1.20*** 1.21*** 1.20*** 1.36*** 1.20*** 1.37*** 1.18*** 1.38*** 1.18*** 1.38***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.4 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.87*** 0.76*** 0.89*** 0.74*** 0.88*** 0.76*** 0.88***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1.5 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.90*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.96*** 0.87*** 1.00*** 0.88 1.04***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
2.5 1.45*** 1.46*** 1.46*** 1.59*** 1.47*** 1.61*** 1.42*** 1.72*** 1.44*** 1.73***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
3.5 1.55*** 1.56*** 1.56*** 1.70*** 1.58*** 1.70*** 1.59*** 1.74*** 1.61*** 1.75***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
4.5 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.43*** 1.51*** 1.44*** 1.52*** 1.50*** 1.53*** 1.51*** 1.53***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
5.5 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.89*** 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.98*** 0.82*** 0.97*** 0.82*** 0.98***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
1.6+ 1.06*** 1.10*** 1.12*** 1.13*** 1.16*** 1.17*** 1.02*** 1.25*** 1.04 1.30***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
2.6+ 1.80*** 1.82*** 1.77*** 1.97*** 1.80*** 1.99*** 1.73*** 2.00*** 1.75 2.03***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
3.6+ 2.05*** 2.07*** 1.96*** 2.26*** 1.99*** 2.27*** 1.93*** 2.29*** 1.95*** 2.30***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
4.6+ 2.16*** 2.18*** 2.06*** 2.37*** 2.08*** 2.36*** 2.02*** 2.41*** 2.03*** 2.43***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
5.6+ 2.18*** 2.19*** 2.04*** 2.41 2.04*** 2.42*** 1.99*** 2.49*** 1.98*** 2.50***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
6.6+ 2.12*** 2.11*** 1.93*** 2.36*** 1.93*** 2.35*** 1.88*** 2.44*** 1.88*** 2.44***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
N 364,422 364,422 364,422 364,422 291,960 291,960
R2 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71
Adj-R2 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52
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Table 3.2: Regressions on sales not controlling for selection
Spec. (4 rest) (4)
Border 0 1 0 1
Tenure
1 NA 0.20*** NA 0.20***
(0.01) (0.01)
2 0.63*** 0.94*** 0.63*** 0.94***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
3 0.99*** 1.37*** 1.00*** 1.37***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
4 1.31*** 1.71*** 1.32*** 1.73***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
5 1.54*** 2.02*** 1.53*** 2.04***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
6 1.73*** 2.25*** 1.74*** 2.26***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
7 1.86*** 2.45*** 1.86*** 2.47***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
8 1.98*** 2.60*** 1.98*** 2.61***




Table 3.3: Probability of Exit
Spec. (5 rest) (5) (6 rest) (6) (7 rest) (7)
Border NA NA 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Tenure
1 NA NA NA -0.09*** NA -0.09*** NA -0.07*** NA -0.07***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2 -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.12*** -0.17***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
3 -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.21***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
4 -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.34*** -0.30*** -0.34*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.24***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
5 -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.33*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.36*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.25***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
6 -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.38*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
log(sales) NA NA NA NA -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
N 402,582 402,582 402,582 402,582 402,582 402,582
R2 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.54
Adj-R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.34
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